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The European Union, Borders and Conflict Transformation: The Case of 
Cyprus  
  
 
Abstract 
Much of the existing literature on the European Union (EU), conflict transformation 
and border dynamics, has been premised on the assumption that the nature of the 
border determines EU intervention and the consequences that flow from this in terms 
of EU impact. This article aims to transcend this literature through assessing how 
domestic interpretations influence EU border transformation in conflict situations, 
taking Cyprus as a case study. Moreover, its objective is to fuse the literature on EU 
bordering impact and perceptions of the EU’s normative projection in conflict 
resolution. Pursuing this line of enquiry is an attempt to depart from the notion of 
borders being constructed solely by unidirectional EU logics of engagement or 
bordering practices to a conceptualisation of the border as co-constituted space, 
where the interpretations of the EU’s normative projections by conflict parties, and 
the strategies that they pursue, can determine the relative openness of the EU border. 
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Introduction  
A central issue for this article is how we can better understand the EU‟s ability to 
constitute open frontiers and create a climate for reconciliation in conflict situations. 
Much of the existing literature on the EU, conflict resolution and border dynamics, 
has been premised on the assumption that the nature of the border determines EU 
intervention and the consequences that flow from this in terms of EU impact i.e. a 
linear or causal relationship. This article aims to transcend this literature through 
assessing how domestic interpretations influence EU border transformation. Fusion of 
the literature on EU bordering impact and the EU‟s normative projection in conflict 
resolution, it is suggested, captures in a more nuanced way precisely how 
differentiated interpretations of the EU as a force for good (Pace 2007) amongst 
conflicting parties hinder or enable the EU‟s ability to create a more fluid, networked 
(non) border in conflict situations (Walters 2004; 679-682). To this end, it is argued 
that the Cyprus conflict, with insider and outsider dynamics, provides a salient case 
study of how EU borders are co-constituted and more specifically, how such borders 
emerge out of a dynamic political process. 
The Cyprus issue represents a unique and challenging problem given the involvement 
of the two communities in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, a candidate for EU accession. 
It has had negative consequences for internal EU governance across a diverse range 
of issues, and the EU objective of achieving relative stability in the eastern 
Mediterranean. There are also broader security implications in terms of the evolving 
NATO-EU relationship and European energy policy. Moreover, it has clear 
ramifications for the Turkish accession process: the Cyprus issue is the major obstacle 
to Turkish progression. Turkey refuses to comply with its EU contractual obligations 
and has been given until the end of 2009 to do so by the EU. The Cyprus issue then, 
is truly „a real European problem…hurting the European Union‟ (Olli Rehn, 2008; 7) 
which if not resolved in the very near future, will have ramifications for the EU 
across many policy dimensions, and its security aspirations in particular.    
Cyprus joined the EU on the 1 May 2004 as a divided island following the rejection 
by the Greek Cypriot community
1
 of the United Nations (UN) sponsored plan for 
reunification
2
. This plan advocated a bicommunal, bizonal, federal solution with 
equal political rights for each community – and was supported by Turkey and a 
majority in the Turkish Cypriot community. However, they remain outside the EU, 
 3 
with Turkey a candidate for accession, and the Turkish Cypriots institutionally 
excluded and unable to fully benefit from EU initiatives designed to enhance their 
economic welfare. The EU, despite being embroiled in the dispute, has been 
constrained in transforming the (de facto) EU hard border that separates the two 
communities in Cyprus. A significant reason for this was the approach of the Cypriot 
government under the nationalist President, Tassos Papadopoulos (2003-2008). His 
modernist conception of the border led him to pursue a „European solution‟3 with the 
goal of securing a tight federal solution (unitary and sovereign Cypriot state) and the 
rule of the majority community. This was sustained by using a narrow definition of 
the EU‟s normative construction to legitimate and reinforce his position – and a 
strategy of manifest manipulation, both inside and outside the EU milieu.  
Furthermore, progress within the primary mediating process under the UN umbrella 
was slow in this period. Despite agreement between the leaders of the two 
communities under the „Gambari process‟ (8 July 2006) to accelerate resolution 
efforts
4
, and agreement on a common framework
5
, the reality was more reflective of a 
„creeping divergence‟ (Cyprus After Accession 2007). This political dynamic placed 
limitations on the EU‟s ability to facilitate movement to an EU open frontier in 
Cyprus. The election of a more moderate Greek Cypriot leader, Dimitris Christofias, 
in the Presidential elections on the 24 February 2008, led to renewed optimism that 
the EU hard border separating the conflicting parties could be transformed into an 
open frontier.  
This article aims to examine the extent to which the EU border in Cyprus is being re-
constituted within the above context. It takes as a starting point Rumelili‟s model of 
EU bordering practices (2007). Second, it suggests that we need to move beyond this 
framework in order to explore more precisely how interpretations of the EU as a 
normative construction (Pace 2007), and the strategies pursued by conflict parties, 
impact on the EU‟s ability to constitute borders at different times, and ultimately, to 
transform EU borders in conflict situations. Pursuing this line of enquiry is an attempt 
to depart from the notion of borders being constructed solely by unidirectional EU 
logics of engagement or bordering practices to a conceptualisation of the border as 
co-constituted space, where the interpretations of the EU‟s normative projections by 
conflict parties, and the strategies that they pursue, can determine the relative 
openness of the EU border. 
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The next section will provide an overview of the theoretical literature on the EU and 
conflict transformation and differentiate the approach to be utilised in the paper. 
Section three will provide an overview of EU bordering practice in the pre-accession 
period, with an emphasis on the critical post-1999 period, when Turkey was accepted 
as a candidate for EU accession. Section four will assess how interpretations of the 
EU as a force for good by conflict parties in the Cypriot dispute, and the strategies 
pursued by them, affected EU bordering practice in Cyprus in the Papadopoulos era 
(2003-8). This section will focus on the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey. It will not include an analysis of Greece, as despite it being a significant actor 
and one of the three guarantor states, since 1999 and during the period in question, it 
distanced itself from the position of the Cypriot government and chose to engage only 
at a minimal level diplomatically, with the Cyprus issue (i.e. Greece has been more 
withdrawn and has thus had less impact on the overall dynamics of border 
transformation in Cyprus). Section five will provide a brief analysis of the impact of 
the more moderate Christofias government, elected in February 2008. The concluding 
section will draw out the main implications of the analysis.   
 
The EU, Conflict Transformation and Bordering Practices    
Many scholars have been engaged in explaining and providing a more complex 
understanding of the EU‟s role in conflict transformation. Such analyses have focused 
on enlargement, and the conditions under which the EU‟s power of attraction can 
facilitate conflict transformation (Christou 2004, 2002), as well as Europeanisation as 
a conflict resolution tool (Coppieters et al, 2004). Such a perspective emphasises the 
EU‟s potential as a third party actor and framework in meditating disputes, 
influencing conflict dynamics through conditionality or socialisation (Tocci 2004; 
Coppieters et al 2004). Tocci (2007; 17) has also promoted the idea of conflict 
resolution through passive enforcement of rules that emanate from the EU. She 
argues that conceptually, this is distinct from conditionality, in that it is not based on 
changing behaviour based on reward and punishment, but rather, on an in-built 
system of incentives and legally based rule-bound cooperation.    
Others have focused on both the direct and indirect effects of the EU actions in 
conflicts (Hill 2001, Diez et al 2006, 2008). For example, in relation to direct effect 
Diez et al highlight a „compulsory‟ impact, referring to the employment by the EU of 
carrots and sticks related to membership prospects and association, in order to induce 
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a change of behaviour amongst the (elite) actors in the conflict, towards resolution. 
They also identify a „connective impact‟, which relates more to the EU‟s impact 
within the societal/civil society dimension, through both its material resources but 
also its normative influence. In relation to indirect effect, they identify an „enabling‟ 
impact and a „constructive‟ impact. The former refers to the potential ideological and 
normative impact of the EU framework in terms of legitimising alternative options for 
foreign policy and resolution of conflict at elite level, and the latter, on the EU‟s 
discursive ability in terms of transforming identities at societal level and 
desecuritising the conflict.                
Although such an approach provides valuable insight into the strengths and 
limitations of the EU as an actor and framework in conflict situations, it has also led 
to a linear (non-dynamic) analysis of the EU‟s impact in terms of border 
transformation. In addition, it has been less successful, as pointed out by Rumelili 
(2007; 109), in sufficiently addressing the „interactive dimension of conflict 
resolution, particularly the question of how the EU can simultaneously influence the 
insider and outsider states to promote conciliatory policies on both sides‟. She 
suggests that the most fruitful way of achieving this is through a systematic 
evaluation of the EU‟s bordering practices, which are seen as a significant condition 
for the EU‟s impact beyond its boundaries.     
Rumelili (2007; 109) posits that EU borders can be understood within a multi-
dimensional framework – and drawing from Smith (1996), distinguishes between the 
EU‟s institutional, physical and identity borders (Table 1 below). It is argued that the 
EU‟s bordering practices can be understood within a spectrum (ideal-type) of hard 
borders on one end and open frontiers on the other, with several implications for EU 
impact (as conceptualised by Diez et al above).  
 
Table 1 here  
 
In terms of the outsider state or community, a hard EU border first, restricts severely 
the EU‟s compulsory impact because effectively, it impedes the development of 
dense institutional relations and other bilateral and transnational links from evolving 
beyond a low-level dynamic. Second, it negates the enabling impact, as the 
legitimacy of the EU and its policies, as well as identification with the EU, is low. 
Finally, hard borders also have a negative (non-constructive) effect in terms of 
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connective and constructive impacts in the outsider state. It is difficult to engage in 
transnational or trans-community interaction and contact with a hard border, and it 
also reinforces „the conflict-enhancing self versus other identity distinctions between 
the conflict parties by superimposing on them the more authoritative distinction of 
European versus non-European‟ (Rumelili 2007: 111).  
Conversely, with EU open frontiers, impact is much stronger and the EU‟s ability to 
positively influence movement towards resolution of a conflict is enhanced. In this 
sense, the compulsory impact on the outsider state is stronger both in terms of the 
increased density of institutional relations and increased links between governments 
and communities, creating a greater sense of common identity between the inside 
state and the outside state. The EU‟s enabling impact is also enhanced through more 
positive identification with the EU and its policies at community and governmental 
level, thus providing a more legitimate basis for implementing changes emanating 
from the EU. Finally, there is a more effective connective and constructive impact 
through open EU frontiers. Enhanced contact across all levels builds mutual trust and 
cooperation, and is underpinned by shared EU values and an interest in resolving the 
conflict. It also weakens the fractious and divisive discourses of self versus other in 
the two communities thus promoting a conflict reducing rather than conflict 
enhancing milieu (Rumelili 2007; 108-12).               
In terms of the insider state, a hard EU border allows the empowerment of hardliners 
at domestic level that wish to utilise the EU milieu, and the instruments within it, 
against the outside community or state, in order to promote a divisive rather than a 
reconciliatory approach. This in turn, creates a perception within the outside state or 
community of a non-neutral EU, captured by the insider state for the pursuit of its 
own interest. Such a perception further reinforces a negative identification with the 
EU amongst elites and societal actors in the outsider state or community.   
Conversely, with EU open frontiers there is more likely to be a reconciliatory 
approach and a greater possibility that the conflict will be transformed through being 
part of the same EU community. Such open frontiers, it is argued, allow for the 
empowerment of more moderate domestic actors and the incapacitation of 
„maximalist‟ elites seeking to utilise the EU to secure concessions from the outsider 
state or community. Indeed according to Rumelili (2007; 112), „the instruments of 
power possessed by virtue of EU membership…become less convenient and more 
costly…for the insider state‟. In turn, the perception of capture becomes less 
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significant, with an increasing willingness between the conflicting communities or 
states to reconcile through the use of EU norms and principles.           
Whilst the Rumelili framework (2007) provides a basis for evaluating conflict 
situations with insider/outsider dynamics, it is also structuralist in its approach (i.e. 
emphasising where EU policies and practices can constrain and constitute domestic 
conflict actors to act in certain ways). Moving beyond it, therefore, will allow for a 
more nuanced and agency-based analysis of border transformation through providing 
an understanding of precisely how differentiated interpretations of the EU‟s self 
construction as a force for good amongst conflicting parties
6
, hinder or enable the 
movement to open frontiers or „interdependent borderlands‟ (Newman and Paasi 
1998; Newman 2000). The approach taken here then, implies a notion of the border 
that is based on a critique of mainstream modernist approaches to conceptualising 
territory and space (Agnew 1999; Newman 2000; Paasi 1996, 2003; Newman and 
Paasi 1998; Ruggie 1993)
7
. Within modernist approaches those at the margins, local 
conflict actors in this case, are largely ignored in their ability to constitute borders. 
The suggestion here is that conflict actors, whilst closely linked to and defined by the 
centre (the EU) to which they are marginal, also exist as sites of action themselves 
(Shields 1991; Parker and Armstrong 2000; Parker 2008). 
In this context it is argued that the more recent literature exploring the concept of the 
EU‟s normative power (Manners 2002, 2006) in conflict resolution (Pace 2007) can 
be helpful. This literature has sought to critically assess the powerful self-construction 
of the EU
8
 as a force for good in world affairs and in particular, whether such a 
construction contributes to the EU‟s success in constituting open or integrated 
borders, or disempowers it as an actor in conflict resolution (Pace 2007, Diez and 
Pace 2007). Moreover, such an approach allows for a better understanding of the 
construction of borders in conflict situations and offers more analytical specificity in 
assessing the potential limits and strengths of the projection of the EU as a normative 
power in constituting borders. More precisely, though the Rumelili (2007) framework 
allows for the idea that reconciliation is more likely between conflict parties where 
they identify with key EU values in a situation underpinned by open frontiers – it is 
important that we understand precisely how conflict parties, through the strategies 
they construct and pursue, identify and interpret EU norms projected through 
bordering practices, if we are to move to a more complex assessment of when the EU 
can transform borders in conflict situations and indeed create open or integrative 
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frontiers characterised by „transformative, dynamic space where social relations are 
recreated‟(Walters 2004).  
Of course, domestic perceptions of EU interventions and the EU‟s normative power 
in conflict situations have been addressed in the academic literature (Rumelili 2008, 
2004; Pace 2007; Diez and Pace 2007). This article proposes to add to this through a 
case study of Cyprus, and a synthesis of the work on EU bordering practice and the 
EU‟s normative power, in order to enhance our understanding of why (van Houtum 
2005) and how borders can be (re- and co-) constituted in conflict situations. In other 
words, the main contribution of this article is on how conflict parties can constitute 
EU conflict borders – not just on how the EU can provide the necessary incentives to 
determine the actions and change the behaviour of conflict actors. It also attempts to 
add to the existing approaches by suggesting that there are various (ideal type) 
strategies that conflict parties can adopt based on their interpretation of EU norms, 
which also impact on the EU‟s ability to transform hard borders into open frontiers, 
through the different logics at play.  
 
Diagram 1 here  
 
Drawing on and adapting the work of Parker (2008; 13), several strategies can be 
identified that are salient to conflict parties in exerting influence in the context 
outlined above (see Diagram 1). The first of these strategies is that of manifest 
emulation, which is interpreted here, as a situation whereby a conflict party identifies 
with the EU as a force for good and all the EU norms that underpin this. Under these 
circumstances the EU would be expected to have a positive influence, with conflict 
parties more likely to change adapt their behaviour in line with EU action and the 
integration framework. The second strategy is that of manifest manipulation by 
conflict parties. This refers to a strategy that embodies different scenarios: acceptance 
of the EU as a force for good and a rejection of EU norms; acceptance of the EU as a 
force for good, and manipulation of EU norms to enhance rather than ameliorate 
conflict; and finally, a situation where EU norms are accepted by conflict parties, but 
the image of the EU as a force for good is only shared by some conflict parties (Diez 
and Pace 2007). These scenarios suggest reinforcement of conflict enhancing 
dynamics and a negative EU influence on conflict party behaviour. The final strategy 
is that of manifest incompatibility/rejection of the EU as a force for good and all EU 
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norms, and constitutes a situation whereby the EU is „powerless‟ to transform conflict 
situations through direct or indirect means.  
Of course these strategies are only analytical „ideal types‟ and it is recognised that 
there is a great deal of „fuzziness‟ and „overlap‟ in reality. However, such ideal types 
provide us with analytical benchmarks and starting points, from which, complexity 
can be understood through empirical analysis of case studies such as Cyprus. This, in 
turn, can provide us with further evidence of the forces that can determine EU border 
dynamics and indeed, the opportunities and limitations of the EU to pursue strategies 
that will lead to EU integrated frontiers characterised by a networked (non) border 
(Walters 2004) - where there exists a dynamic of deterritorialisation; a diminishing 
relevance of (spatial) lines of division; and differences between self and other are 
reduced.  
Finally, certain points of clarification are needed before proceeding to the analysis. 
First, the suggestion in this article is not that conflict parties agreeing on an EU 
„values‟ script (manifest emulation) is a panacea for resolving conflict (Diagram 1 - 
point b), but that this is minimum requirement for the prospect of transformation in 
the fluid process of (socially) constructing a reconciliatory climate between the 
conflict parties. This is even more salient in the case of Cyprus where the UN is the 
primary and more credible interlocutor for resolving the conflict. In the same vein, it 
is not to suggest that a EU „open frontier‟ (non-networked border) is anything but an 
ideal type, the central dynamics of which offer the possibility of creating a climate for 
transforming conflict in a sustainable way. Recent evidence does suggest that there 
are both points of agreement and disagreement between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots communities on the nature of the EU border that should be created (see 
Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci 2008), but that this does not necessarily imply such views 
are in any way static
9
. In this way, offering a prescription based on such views at any 
one point in time would be to miss the point of the argument being made here – that 
border conflict transformation is a dynamic process where conceptions of the „right‟ 
type of border are constantly under construction. In this context we can simply 
hypothesise that a sustainable solution in Cyprus is  more likely if the ongoing 
negotiations in Cyprus under UN auspices lead to an agreement that accommodates 
the views of both communities within a variant of the „open frontier‟ type (e.g. 
hard/open, soft/open etc)
10
. Second, although a key assertion is that a more dynamic 
picture of EU bordering practice in conflict transformation can be achieved through 
 10 
the framework outlined, it is also acknowledged that the „context‟ can change at any 
particular point in time depending on the forces and logics to be found within the 
conflict space
11
 being analysed. Finally, purpose of this article is to illuminate, in a 
more nuanced way, how agents can determine and constitute borders in conflict 
situations. It is therefore to highlight and analyse the interactive (co-constitutive) 
dimension of the process of EU bordering and how it can be understood in conflict 
transformation. In doing this, it seeks to move away from the idea of conflicts 
existing „out there‟, with only the „correct‟ strategy of intervention needed through 
the appropriate EU logic in order to bring about transformation and reconciliation 
(Albert et al 2008; 9).  
    
EU Bordering Practice and Cyprus 1999-2004 
A logical starting point for an analysis of the Cyprus conflict is the impact of the 
EU‟s policy of exclusion prior to the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, when 
Turkey was granted candidate status. Here, Greece, as the insider state since 1981, 
sought to exert its influence in Greek-Turkish disputes (including Cyprus) through the 
leverage afforded to it by membership and a strategy of manifest manipulation. 
Indeed, the EU was seen a force for good by Greek elites and EU norms were used to 
constrain movement towards an open frontier, empowering hardliners in the Greek 
government and marginalizing alternative voices on the Greek-Turkish relationship 
that sought long-term rapprochement through supporting Turkish orientation towards 
the EU. Furthermore, such a policy provided for relative success in foreign policy 
terms for Greece, and a legitimate platform that was used to secure domestic support 
against Turkey, which was portrayed as „non-European other‟, and threat to the Greek 
state and its security interests.  
Conversely, within Turkey, Greece‟s policy of negative conditionality meant that any 
EU policy intervention in Greek-Turkish relations was interpreted as evidence of 
further European reluctance to include Turkey, and the capture of the EU by Greece 
to pursue its hostile agenda. In essence, the EU‟s hard border with respect to Turkey, 
maintained because of the Greek strategy, served to create a perception amongst 
Turkish elites of the EU as a negative force that only escalated the conflict. The 
impact was the prevention, indirectly, of positive transnational links evolving 
between civil society, business and other interests. Moreover, it legitimated the 
securitised frame within which bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were 
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conducted and served to accentuate the othering of Turkey, adding, rather than 
alleviating, Turkish insecurity about its own identity and European orientation (see 
Rumelili 2007, 2008 for detailed analysis).   
This above context had a direct and indirect impact on the EU dynamics for 
transforming the Cypriot conflict. Greece, whilst supporting the Greek-Cypriot cause 
in different ways at different times, took a strong and more aggressive line under 
Andreas Papandreou‟s leadership in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkey-EU Customs 
Union Agreement signed in 1995 was perceived by the Turkish government and the 
conservative Turkish Cypriot leadership under Rauf Denktash, as evidence of „Greek‟ 
capture in order to secure greater leverage over Turkey in the Cyprus dispute. 
Effectively, Greece had agreed to lift its veto on the Agreement in return for a deal 
which secured the start of accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the 
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996.  
From a Greek Cypriot perpective, Greek support inside the EU, and the subsequent 
decision to accept it as a candidate and begin accession negotiations, served to further 
legitimise its longstanding strategy for resolving the Cyprus issue through involving 
international organisations and sympathetic third parties. For the Greek Cypriot 
leadership, the EU platform, with Greece as the supporting insider state, provided 
additional leverage and mechanisms for resolving the conflict through agreed and 
established UN agreements on the parameters and principles of a solution. From a 
normative perspective, it was justified on the grounds that the EU could not punish 
the Greek Cypriots for what was a violation of international law by Turkey: 
adherence to and observation of international law being a central element within the 
EU‟s normative power construction (Diez and Pace 2007: 8; see also Pace 2007). 
Indeed this justification allowed the Greek Cypriots to pursue a strategy of manifest 
manipulation both within the EU milieu and domestically.                        
Acceptance of Cyprus as a membership candidate reaffirmed the European identity of 
the Greek Cypriots, whilst reinforcing the image of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership as the main threat to a secure and sustainable solution in Cyprus
12
. 
Moreover it served indirectly, to superimpose the European versus non-European 
distinction between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots/Turkey, and limit 
intercommunal and transnational communication and exchange. Whilst the 
application of the (Greek) Cypriot government was seen as legitimate within the EU 
normative framework, it served to marginalise the alternative Turkish Cypriot voices 
 12 
in the north that supported a European orientation through a narrative of manifest 
emulation, and also devalued their sense of European identity through exclusion. This 
reinforced the position of the hardliners in the north under the longstanding leadership 
of Rauf Denktash. EU actions, by confirming their „outsider‟ status, strengthened the 
hand of the Turkish Cypriots in the north and those in Turkey that neither supported 
EU membership or a federal solution to the Cyprus question mediated by the UN. 
Indeed, the conflict enhancing dynamics between the two communities were 
perpetuated by EU policy, with Rauf Denktash, as a direct consequence, pursuing a 
strategy of manifest rejection, and proposing a confederal solution and effective 
separation as a solution to the Cyprus issue in 1998. Denktash, a longstanding critic 
of EU involvement, did not perceive the EU to be normatively „good‟ for the Cyprus 
conflict, consistently arguing that, „They seek to give the Greek Cypriots those rights 
taken away from us and then call this peace. With this so-called peace, they actually 
seek to turn us into an attractive minority and own the whole of Cyprus by means of 
the EU…‟ (Denktash cited in Denktash wants Peace with Sovereignty, 2002). This 
negative view of the EU was also espoused by the more conservative voices (anti-
EU) within the Turkish establishment that supported the status quo situation on the 
island and that believed the conflict was resolved in 1974 (see Bahcheli 2006; Kaliber 
2005; Robins 2007; Tocci 2007). 
The situation after 1999, triggered by improved Greek-Turkish relations bilaterally, 
was sustained and consolidated by the EU through its decision to grant Turkey 
candidate status, and led to the enhancement of the EU‟s identity border with Turkey. 
The affirmation of Turkey‟s identity as a potential EU candidate state and the 
subsequent decision at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 to set a 
date for discussing when accession talks could actually begin, complemented by the 
victory of a more moderate Turkish government in November 2002 led by Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, triggered a fundamental change in Turkish policy towards support 
for the Annan Plan. Indeed, Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AK 
Party), by February 2004, had altered the traditional Turkish position on Cyprus 
espoused by the hardliners
13
, and consolidated support for resolution of the Cyprus 
conflict through the UN Plan, providing the basis for movement to EU open frontiers 
and transformation of the conflict.   
It also provided a basis for the empowerment of Turkish Cypriots that identified with 
the EU as a force for good and resolution of the Cyprus conflict within EU and 
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internationally established norms. Most importantly, following mass demonstrations, 
it led to the opening of the physical border between the north and south in April 2003, 
allowing for the first time after 1974, movement and exchange on a cultural and 
socio-economic level, between and within the two communities (albeit not entirely 
free or open)
14
. Fundamentally, the positive image of the EU as a force for good 
provided a reference for the mobilisation of moderate and liberal voices in the north, 
replacing the manifest rejection strategy of the nationalist hardliners, in particular 
Rauf Denktash. Moreover, as part of this movement, the more moderate Mehmet Ali 
Talat was elected as Prime Minister in December 2003 and President on 17 April 
2005 (with 55% of the vote) on a pro-EU membership and pro-reunification platform, 
in support of the Annan Plan.  
The Greek Cypriot leadership, under Clafkos Clerides, oscillated between a hardline 
approach at the beginning of his Presidency (1993), to a more moderate stance 
towards the end (2003). This was triggered by the realisation of what the EU 
normative framework could provide for Cyprus in security terms, and led eventually 
to a strategy of manifest emulation rather than selective appropriation of EU norms, 
emphasising in January 2003 that EU accession was of „critical, decisive significance‟ 
for Cyprus and that „no mistakes could be made [that] delayed European 
integration…‟ (Clerides 2003). However, the election of President Tassos 
Papadopoulos (right wing DIKO party) in February 2003 led to a much narrower 
interpretation of the EU‟s normative construction based on implementation of the 
four freedoms (services, goods, capital and labour). Although accepting that the EU 
was a force for good in Cyprus, such a strategy enabled the Papadopolous 
government to pursue a strategy of manifest manipulation, strengthening and 
reinforcing its hardline position (Diez and Pace 2007; 9), with the consequence that it 
enhanced rather than reduced the opportunity for creating a EU open frontier in 
Cyprus.       
 
The Accession of Cyprus: Maintaining Hard EU Borders  
 
The EU Context   
The clear failing of the EU‟s catalytic effect through the process of accession15, 
despite the hope that was attached to it, led to a re-evaluation and upgrading of EU 
policy towards the Turkish Cypriots in order to facilitate the movement towards EU 
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open frontiers in the Cyprus conflict. Whilst EU policy towards Cyprus remained 
unchanged on a macro level in the post-accession period (after 1 May 2004) – „to 
engage and intervene to facilitate the main UN process of mediation between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots‟ (Interview, European Commission, 2006) - on a micro 
level, measures were introduced reflective of the shift away from the previously 
dominant discourse for blame which rested with Turkey and the hardline Turkish 
Cypriot leadership.   
The EU sought to reward the positive attitude of the Turkish Cypriot community with 
Regulations aimed at reinforcing the Turkish Cypriot identification with the EU as 
force for good, and opening up institutional
16
 and physical borders. Indeed the 
Commission approach was to open the border in Cyprus „through fostering direct 
links with the Turkish Cypriots and reducing the gap so that they feel less isolated‟ 
(Interview, European Commission, 2006). The consequence, however, was the 
reinforcement of the EU hard border towards Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, as the 
Papadopoulos government strategy was to maximise its leverage within the EU to 
force concessions compatible with a tight federal (unitary state) solution, rather than a 
more flexible bizonal, bicommunal federation (with two constituent states).   
Most significantly, the EU sought to open the institutional and physical border and 
transform the identity border through enhancing an existing package (agreed in June 
2003) of measures for northern Cyprus worth a total of €12 million that was aimed at 
promoting economic development and bringing Turkish Cypriots closer to the EU. 
The Green Line Regulation (GLR) (EC No 866/2004) was adopted and implemented 
prior to the accession of Cyprus on 1 May 2004, in order to secure its passage 
unchallenged. The Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) (EC No 389/2006) and the Direct 
Trade Regulation (DTR) (Proposed Council Regulation, COM 2004) that followed, 
were proposals put forward by the European Commission in July 2004 with the 
objective of enhancing the EU‟s direct and indirect impact and transforming the 
economic status of the Turkish Cypriot north, with the aim of simultaneously 
removing one of the significant barriers to finding a solution. The FAR involved a 
disbursement of funds, totalling €259 million, and was agreed by all member states 
with one Greek Cypriot provision – that funds should not be utilised to build on land 
owned by the Greek Cypriots or on public organisations or bodies.  
The DTR, however, was more controversial. Its main purpose was to allow direct 
trade between the EU and the north, with the potential of opening up the physical and 
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institutional border, as well as reinforcing the European identity of the Turkish 
Cypriots. In relation to Turkey, the positive decision to recognise her as a candidate 
for membership in 1999 was followed by an offer to review progress at Copenhagen 
in December 2004. The terms for Turkish accession were eventually defined, 
formulated and agreed in December 2005, committing Turkey to fulfil the contractual 
obligations (implement accession norms) of the process leading to eventual 
membership of the EU (discussed below).  
Despite international as well as internal institutional pressure, once Cyprus entered 
the EU on the 1 May 2004, an additional platform was provided on which the 
Papadopoulos government could project and reinforce its strategy, based on a narrow, 
yet legitimating, interpretation of the EU‟s normative construction that emphasised 
the „implementation of the acquis communautaire throughout the territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus [to] reverse the tragic division of our country in united Europe‟ 
(Papadopoulos cited in Cyprus Signs EU Accession Treaty,  2003). However, the 
Greek Cypriot interpretation of the EU norms based on the strict requirements of the 
acquis, were not necessarily compatible with the broader EU norms relating to 
cooperation, equality, and peace, with the consequence that EU impact was 
minimised in terms of its direct compulsory and enabling effects, but also its indirect 
connective and constructive effects. There existed a paradox: the Greek Cypriot 
solution did not necessitate embedded change in relation to key EU norms on the 
ground (see Richmond 2005: 7), despite its compatibility with the four freedoms.   
 
Domestic Context: Conflict Party Strategies 
 
The Greek Cypriots 
Although the Papadopolous strategy of manifest manipulation was opposed in the 
south by the more moderate right wing quarters represented by the Democratic Rally 
(DISY)
17
 and the United Democrats (EDI), this was effectively marginalised. The 
Cypriot government had considerable support for its policies within Greek Cypriot 
civil society and significantly, from the communist party AKEL (Progressive Party of 
the Working People), which held the support of a third of the electorate. AKEL, 
traditionally at the forefront of reconciliation initiatives and maintaining 
intercommunal links with Turkish Cypriots in the north, was until February 2004, 
 16 
associated with a more moderate position in relation to the „terms‟ for a solution of 
the Cyprus conflict (as agreed in international law).  
It can be argued that AKEL‟s „no‟ vote in the referendum18, and the coalition formed 
with the Papadopoulos government, was critical in shifting the opinions of the Greek 
Cypriot public towards a negative vote in the Annan Plan referendum. Indeed, 
AKEL‟s importance to the continuation of a the policy of the Papadopoulos 
government on the Cyprus conflict was reinforced by parliamentary elections in the 
south in May 2006, where they received 131, 066 of the votes (31%) compared to 75, 
458 of the votes (18%) for the Democratic Party (DIKO) of Tassos Papadopoulos 
(Cyprus ruling coalition wins poll, May 2006). 
Cyprus, as the insider state, aimed „to make the Cyprus problem a European 
problem…believing in this way that we can increase our possibilities of seeking a 
solution‟ (Interview, COREPER, 2006). This meant manipulation of EU norms 
through the available mechanisms and tools, to achieve a „European solution‟19. For 
Tassos Papadopoulos, the strategy of manifest manipulation, reflected a belief that he 
had „received a state‟ on election and that he did not want to „deliver a community‟. 
Indeed in his televised address to the nation encouraging the rejection of the Annan 
Plan (7 April 2003), he urged Greek Cypriots „to defend the Republic of Cyprus, 
saying no to its abolition‟. Moreover this was underpinned by a historical conviction20 
that power with the Turkish Cypriots could not be shared on the basis of equal 
political status.  
Although the Cypriot government was willing to share prosperity and soften the 
border in a socio-economic sense, as demonstrated by domestic measures allowing 
increased freedom of movement for Turkish Cypriots to live and work in the south, it 
was unwilling to allow any initiative that impacted directly on the „sovereign‟ power 
and (Greek) identity of the Cypriot state, before a solution securing its rights as a 
majority, was agreed (i.e. modernist interpretation of the border). Thus, whilst the 
FAR in principle, and as a separate tool for potentially opening up the physical and 
institutional border between the EU and the north was agreed separately in February 
2006 (€259million), the DTR was rejected for fears that it would result in an 
increased „international presence for the administration in the north and the overt 
recognition of the secessionist entity‟, subsequently impacting negatively on „Turkish 
Cypriot aspirations for movement towards reunification‟ (Interview, COREPER, 
2006).  
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The Turkish Cypriots  
The new and ambitious FAR and DTR proposals raised the expectations of Turkish 
Cypriots that perceived the EU to be „normatively‟ beneficial in Cyprus. There was 
an assumption that the Turkish Cypriots, having voted positively for the Annan Plan, 
would be rewarded through measures to extend EU benefits to the north, with the aim 
of facilitating growth and prosperity, and providing a more cooperative basis for 
moving towards a more open frontier and negotiated settlement. Within the moderate 
leadership circle, Mehmet Ali Talat, and officials within his Republican Turkish Party 
(RTP), expressed the importance of establishing „voice opportunities for the Turkish 
Cypriots institutionally‟; enhancing the economic status of the north and opening up 
the physical borders between the north and the EU through the FAR and DTR; and 
providing a platform for reinforcing the sense of „European identity‟ that evolved in 
the north in the pre-accession process. Discursively, at least, they projected a strategy 
of manifest emulation (see Talat 2005).  
The consequence of the Greek Cypriot strategy, however, prevented an inclusive EU 
approach that would allow the necessary inter-communal links and interdependence 
and exchange between the two communities to evolve through EU initiatives. The 
necessary climate for cooperation was not created, leading to the incomplete 
implementation of the GLR because of its unpopularity with Turkish Cypriots, 
reluctant to entrust more than 3 per cent of their trade to Greek Cypriots, and because 
of obstructionist legislation put in place by the Greek Cypriot government for its 
effective working. The implementation of the FAR has not led to a more open 
physical or institutional border with the EU because Commission officials have been 
constrained from formally developing working relationships with „entities in the 
north‟ because of the issue of „political recognition‟. The DTR still remains on the 
EU negotiating table without agreement to implement it and has the potential to 
unlock substantive conflict reducing and desecuritising dynamics and opportunities 
for the movement to EU open frontiers.  
The consequences of this have been twofold: first, the bordering impact of EU 
initiatives on pro-solution and pro-European elites and civil society actors and groups 
in the north, has been negative, directly and indirectly; second, the Turkish Cypriots 
supportive of the EU, have been constrained in pursuing a strategy of emulation and 
integration with the EU. More specifically, polls indicate that disappointment in the 
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north has manifested itself in different ways (see Lordos 2006), with evidence 
suggesting a decrease in the support for the EU as a „force for good‟ and its 
credibility in relation to lifting the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community 
through projection and diffusion of EU norms (Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci 2008; 
Senyigit 2006; Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Interview, European Commission, 2006).  
From a Turkish Cypriot leadership perspective, the lack of progress in the 
development of the north was directly attributable to the failure of the EU to turn its 
rhetoric into action –with criticism of EU officials and (Greek) Cypriot government 
strategy that constrained progress. The alternative voices within liberal-leftist circles 
(known as the Jasmine coalition)
21, although critical of the Cypriot government‟s 
strategy to further Greek Cypriot interests within the EU (perception of capture) and 
undermine those of Turkish Cypriots – argue that the best way to overcome this is 
through further and incremental emulation of the EU‟s normative framework as 
citizens of the EU, and the rights that this accrues to them. From the perspective of 
nationalist and conservative forces in the north, which do not perceive the EU as a 
force for good, Cypriot membership of the EU is viewed as illegal – thus the lack of 
any impact with regard to EU measures and the scepticism this creates, serves as fuel 
for their arguments of secession and a strategy of manifest rejection, although there is 
still only minority support for their position within civil society.          
 
Turkey  
The strategy of the Papadopoulos government, in particular its manifestation within 
the EU milieu - through a refusal to discuss the DTR - also had implications for 
moving towards an EU open frontier between the Greek Cypriots and Turkey. The 
Turkish government‟s perception of capture, and manipulation by the (Greek) Cypriot 
government of EU norms in order to achieve its aims, led to the linking by Turkey of 
the EU‟s commitment to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkish 
contractual obligations relating to the diffusion and implementation of the norms 
associated with the accession process. This effectively, hardened the border between 
the EU and Turkey and the possibility of further cooperative movement on Cyprus 
policy within Turkey. Moreover, it led to a Turkish government strategy of manifest 
manipulation within the accession process in order to secure EU (read Greek Cypriot) 
concessions on the Turkish Cypriot north.  
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A critical obligation has been that of the extension of Turkey‟s custom union with the 
EU towards the ten new member states that joined in May 2004, which included 
Cyprus. The terms of the accession negotiations that were agreed in December 2004 
committed Turkey to the ratification of an Additional Protocol for the extension of 
the Customs Union, which in relation to Cyprus meant opening Turkish ports and 
airports to (Greek) Cypriot ships and planes. However, the Turkish government has 
asserted consistently that it will not fulfil any such obligations because of the issue of 
recognition, and the fact that the Greek Cypriot leadership has blocked EU initiatives 
aimed at lifting the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in the north i.e. the DTR in the 
Council of Ministers
22
.  
Indeed, the perception of the EU as a force for good in Cyprus amongst pro-EU 
reformists in Turkey has dissipated given the inability of the EU to create the 
necessary environment or mobilise the necessary mechanisms and processes in order 
to turn its rhetoric into action. Whilst informal efforts have been made by various EU 
Presidencies
23
 to resolve the DTR issue (see Christou 2006a), the lack of agreement 
has served to enhance the support of the hardline conservative voices in Turkey 
within the military and bureaucracy that are sceptical of the EU‟s normative 
construction, and the EU-orientated AK Party policy on Cyprus. Even though such 
voices, and parallel to these, a neo-nationalist sentiment, has grown in Turkey against 
„Western‟ interference (Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead 2007), it has not, thus 
far, despite support from the Kemalist CHP, the Democratic Left Party and the right 
wing Genç Party, emerged as a dominant political ideology or discourse supported by 
a majority in civil society.  
Significantly, although such opposition has constrained the pace of Europeanisation 
(implementation of EU accession norms), it has not resulted in the defeat of the more 
moderate AK Party, who won 46.7% of the vote in the parliamentary elections in July 
2007, with former Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, also being elected as President of 
Turkey in August 2007, despite the objections of the armed forces and its leadership 
under General Yasar Büyükanit. Such hardline opposition to the EU normative 
construction, and to granting any further concessions on Cyprus via the EU process, 
however, cannot be underestimated, and is a constraint on the manoeuvrability of the 
AK Party domestically and on the Cyprus issue
24
.  
In this context the Papadopolous government strategy of manifest manipulation 
pursued through the use of negative conditionality to secure concessions from Turkey 
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on Cyprus, had several consequences. First, it led to a perception of bias and capture 
by the Turkish government, which supported the Annan Plan and a bizonal, 
bicommunal solution to the Cyprus problem. This only served to perpetuate the 
conflict enhancing dynamics in Cyprus, with a fundamental conflict between Turkish 
implementation of the EU‟s accession norms (in the form of the Additional Protocol 
provisions), and the Turkish government‟s interpretation of those norms in relation to 
the Cyprus conflict and the movement to EU open frontiers with the north (through 
the DTR). Moreover, this served to impede the evolution of trustful and cooperative 
relationships between Turkish and Greek Cypriot elites, business representatives, 
tourist organisations, and civil society groups. The issues of the DTR and the 
Additional Protocol, therefore, remain a major constraint on movement to an open 
frontier, with the latter representing „the main obstacle for significant progress in 
Turkey‟s accession process‟ (Barroso 2008, 10 April 2008). Moreover, it hinders both 
the potential direct and indirect impact that the EU might have in Turkey in relation 
to the Cyprus conflict. It also promotes and reproduces discourses that reinforce 
division, and identities in Turkey and southern Cyprus that emphasise difference and 
antagonism, in particular in relation to being „European‟.     
 
Transforming the Cyprus Conflict: Towards Open Frontiers?  
The election of the more moderate Dimitris Christofias, as President of Cyprus on the 
24 February 2008, created a similar potential dynamic for conflict transformation to 
that of the earthquake diplomacy between Greece and Turkey in 1999, which 
triggered the subsequent EU decision to reinforce the positive climate that evolved 
between the two countries. After splitting from the governing AKEL-DIKO-EDEK
25
 
coalition in July 2007, Christofias, the leader of AKEL, campaigned on a more 
constructive strategy to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue than the hardline 
approach of Tassos Papadopolous.  
Indeed, on his election, he pledged that it would be „a Presidency for all Cypriots‟ 
with the aim of delivering „a just solution to the Cyprus problem‟. He also stressed 
the importance of the UN (Gambari) process, providing for bicommunal talks at 
technical and working group level, as an important „starting point‟ for breaking the 
deadlock with the Turkish Cypriots. Only one member of the previous Cypriot 
Council of Ministers remains in post (see Cyprus News No.222, Feb 2008) and 
importantly, the Foreign Minister position went to the more moderate Markos 
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Kyprianou, who has both experience and knowledge of working within the EU 
machinery after resigning his post as EU Health Commissioner to take up this 
responsibility. Other changes indicating a more proactive approach to reaching 
solution have included the establishment of a Turkish Affairs Bureau at the 
Presidential Palace. 
Christofias‟ victory suggests that civil society attitudes have become less militant 
within the Greek Cypriot south over the last four years
26
. Sixty five percent of Greek 
Cypriots voted for pro-solution candidates in the first round of the election (Lichfield, 
18 Feb 2008), indicating the dissatisfaction with the divisive „us and them‟ approach 
to the Cyprus issue pursued by the Papadopoulos government. This significant 
domestic change has certainly marginalised the hardliners and provided a more 
cooperative climate for movement towards transformation of the Cyprus conflict. The 
Christofias approach, within a month of election, led to substantively more progress 
than his predecessor, in the UN process. A meeting between Christofias and Talat on 
the 21 March 2008 yielded agreement
27
 on the establishment of technical committees 
to deal with power-sharing, EU matters, security, territory, property and economic 
matters and working groups, to address everyday issues such as crime, commerce, 
cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health and the 
environment. Moreover, in their final review of the work of the groups and 
committees on 25 July 2008
28
, the two leaders decided to started negotiations for a 
solution on 3 September 2008, under UN auspices
29
. In addition, the symbolic Ledra 
Street crossing point, which had previously been the subject of much political rancour 
and resulted only in conflict enhancing dynamics on the island,
30
 was opened in April 
2008 to allow the further socio-economic, cultural and political evolution of trans-
communal links.  
It is unclear at the time of writing whether there has been a reinterpretation by the 
Christofias government of EU norms (the meaning of Europeanisation), beyond the 
„narrow‟ application of the Papadopolous era, and indeed a transformation of 
strategy. Whilst he has rejected the accusation of being a Euro-sceptic, and indeed 
asserted that he is a „Euro-fighter…[working] for Cyprus‟s best interests within 
Europe‟, it is not yet clear how this will translate into strategy in relation to EU norms 
beyond the fact that on EU issues there were „gaps that could be bridged‟ (Christofias 
cited in Cyprus News, March 2009). Early indications suggest that the more 
conciliatory approach has catalysed some movement on EU issues. An example here 
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is the amendments to the Green Line Regulation that were approved by the European 
Commission following the momentum created by the Ledra Street opening. The 
changes, which Cypriot government officials have not raised any objections to, 
provide for a blanket lifting of the duties on agricultural products originating in the 
north when being traded across the Green Line
31
, and an increase in the value of 
goods contained in personal luggage of persons crossing the line from 135 euros to 
260 euros (Cyprus Weekly, 11-17 April 2008)
32
. 
The amended GLR could, therefore, strengthen the positive direct and indirect impact 
of the EU. However, simply amending the GLR, whilst a step in the right direction, is 
not symbolic of a historic shift that indicates transformative change in the 
interpretation of EU norms (i.e. strategy) and subsequently, the important issues of 
the DTR or indeed the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey 
Custom Union. Whilst the EU continues to warn Turkey that the Additional Protocol 
must be implemented by the end of 2009 for it to make any further progress on its 
accession path, the EU hard border between Turkey and the Cypriot government 
prevents any direct or indirect EU impact on the Turkish government. Indeed, 
movement to an EU open frontier will not materialise unless these issues are resolved.  
 
Conclusions  
The purpose of this article was to focus not just on the cause-effect relationship 
between EU action and Cypriot conflict transformation, but also on the extent to 
which this can be influenced by differing interpretations of the EU as a normative 
force for good amongst conflict parties, and the strategies pursued by them. It has 
shown that despite Commission policy to influence border transformation in the post-
2004 period, the strategy of manifest manipulation pursued by the (Greek) Cypriot 
and Turkish governments, at different times and within different contexts, served to 
marginalise the influence (and emulation strategy) of the (moderate) Turkish 
Cypriots, and undermine EU efforts to constitute a more open, networked EU border 
in Cyprus, through direct or indirect impact.  
Moreover, the case of Cyprus has shown that whilst the conflicting parties shared the 
idea of the EU as a normative power, there existed significant difference in the way in 
which key EU norms were interpreted, accepted and embedded, through the different 
logics at play. From a Greek Cypriot perpective, Europeanisation entailed 
implementation of the four freedoms, whilst for Turkey, any positive movement 
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flowing from the EU normative power construct in the pre-accession period was 
negated by a more conservative interpretation linked to what was perceived as an 
inconsistency relating to the EU‟s normative projection towards Turkish Cypriots, 
and its inability to convert policy into effective action because of the manifest 
manipulation strategy of the „insider‟ Cypriot government. The consequence in 
Cyprus was the inability of the EU to catalyse movement to more open institutional 
and physical borders and reinforce the European identity of the Turkish Cypriots that 
perceived the EU as a force for good. It also hardened the identity border between the 
EU and Turkey, further undermining the EU‟s normative power (through 
conditionality) in the accession process and in relation to the Cyprus conflict, whilst 
also perpetuating rather than alleviating Turkish insecurity about its European 
orientation.      
The election of a more moderate President in the south has led to a positive „local‟ 
climate for cooperation in Cyprus within the UN process. Although this has not 
manifested itself in any significant change in the interpretation of EU norms to date 
and thus a change in the strategy of influence on the part of the new Cypriot 
leadership and government, it has created the potential for the movement to strategies 
of manifest emulation amongst all conflict parties. Ironically, in the case of Cyprus, 
the more reconciliatory climate has not emerged from EU action or policy, but 
through a domestic dynamic that has recaptured a spirit of cooperation between the 
two communities. The impact of the EU as a force for good has been ambiguous at 
best, with a limitation on what the EU can do, because of the differentiated 
interpretations and representations of the EU amongst the conflict parties in the 
Cyprus dispute.  
On a theoretical and policy-making level, the case of Cyprus illuminates some 
important issues in relation to the EU ability to constitute and transform border 
conflicts. It highlights the need to understand in a more sophisticated way, how the 
EU as a normative power construct can have a positive bordering impact in conflict 
situations. In order to achieve this, further research is required to conceptualise the 
„stages of a conflict‟ (Çelik and Rumelili 2006) within which this is possible, how EU 
policies „fit‟ with local interpretations of the intervening actor, and at what point in 
the „cycle of intervention‟ EU action would be most effective (for this, see Albert et 
al 2008). On a broader level, it also points to the EU‟s „logics of engagement‟ when 
aiming to transform borders, and the constitutive power of those outside as well as 
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those inside the EU, to impact not just on the nature of the border the EU is 
attempting to reshape, but also on the identity of the EU as an international actor and 
the narrative that underpins its projection as a force for good in (re) ordering Europe. 
This is a particularly salient issue for future research on the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) (see Browning and Joenniemi 2008; Browning and Christou, 2008) 
which aims to create security and stability and resolve conflicts from the „outside‟, 
through offering predominantly, an extension of the EU physical border, without the 
requisite deep institutional and identity confirming benefits.  
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1
 In the referendum held in April 2004 on the Annan Plan 75% of Greek Cypriots voted against and 
65% of Turkish Cypriots voted for. See Anastasakis et al (2004) for critical evaluation of the plan. For 
analyses of the main reasons behind the Greek Cypriot rejection, see Attalides (2004), Coufoudakis 
(2004), Lordos (2005, 2006). For an analysis of the Turkish Cypriot „yes‟ vote, see Bahcheli (2004). 
2
 Referred to as the Annan Plan. This allowed for the creation of a „common‟ state government and two 
equal „component states‟, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot, thus ensuring political equality 
for the two communities.  
3
 See Ker-Lindsay (2007) for elaboration on what a „European solution‟ entails 
4
 Agreed in principle between Mehmet Ali Talat and Tassos Papadopoulos.  This process involves 
technical committees to deal with day-to-day issues, working groups to discuss substantive issues, and 
confidence building measures (CBMs) to create a more reconciliatory environment for reaching 
agreement. 
5
 To a bizonal, bicommunal federation based on the equal representation of both communities. 
6
 More detail is provided on the „domestic politics‟ aspect and the importance of domestic perception 
on EU impact in relation to Turkey and Greece in Rumelili (2008) 
7
 This is just a small sample of the literature on borders. Obviously there is a rich debate on the 
ontology of borders, which it would be impossible to cover in any great detail within this article. For an 
overview of some of the key literature and debates on Europe and „borders‟ most relevant to this article 
see van Houtum and Scott (2005); Axford (2006); Delanty (2006); Diez (2006); Walters (2006). 
8
 Note this article is not about how EU normative power is self-constructed, as this is covered 
adequately and comprehensively elsewhere – see Diez (2005), Manners (2006), Pace (2007), Diez and 
Pace (2007), Diez and Manners (2007). 
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9
 Indeed what is implied is quite the opposite – that confidence building measures and the right 
incentives and dialogue can lead to the reconstruction of conflict borders (open borders).   
10
 See Delanty (2006) for a discussion on these dimensions of European borders. See Kaymak, Lordos 
and Tocci (2008) for detail on what is acceptable to Turkish and Greek Cypriots in this context.   
11
 The central analytical focus of this paper is on the „local‟ context, and whilst outside the remit of this 
article, it is important to recognise the „complexity‟ of such a context, especially in relation to the (re) 
construction of the identity border in conflict situations through the lens of colonial practices and the 
colonial legacy of European Empire.  For analyses of the Cyprus problem from these perspectives see 
Constantinou (2007); Kramsch (2006); and Boedeltje, F et al (2007).      
12
 Potential membership also provided a normative framework through the acquis communautaire for 
implementation of the four freedoms.  
13
 For details see Christou (2004); Kaliber (2005); Tocci (2004, 2007) 
14
 A report by the United Nations in Cyprus (UNFICYP Survey, 2007) indicates that this not been very 
successful in fostering a conflict reducing dynamic between the two communities.  
15
 This is now well documented: See Christou (2004); Demetriou (2008); Tocci (2004, 2007)  
16
 More recently (Dec 2007), there was a suggestion that the EU would identify twelve areas of 
governance in which it would help Turkish Cypriots officials harmonise with those of the EU (see 
Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition 2008; p.9). 
17
 Founded by former President, Glafkos Clerides (1993-2003).  
18
 This was on the grounds that the UN (and Turkey) refused to postpone the referendum to provide 
more time for discussion of the critical aspects of the Annan Plan settlement.    
19 In Greece the view was different to that of the Papadopoulos regime. The effects of the process of 
EU socialisation and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement triggered by changing domestic dynamics 
meant that Greek foreign policy, under Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, and Foreign Minister, George 
Papandreou, underwent a transformation that led to a new strategy of manifest emulation of EU norms. 
The result of this was a policy that unequivocally supported and encouraged Turkish membership – 
indeed the view from Greece was that a Turkey included within the EU would bring bilateral and 
regional benefits and facilitate the movement towards developing a more trusting basis for 
transnational cooperation across a range of issues. This also led to a divergence of opinion and gradual 
dissociation with the manipulation tactic pursued by the Papadopoulos regime. Greece‟s support for 
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Turkish membership remained strong, even though Turkey was constantly reminded of its obligations 
on the Cyprus issue through the process of accession. This did not change Costas Karamanlis was 
elected in March 2004. He not only continued the policy of supporting an EU open frontier for Turkey 
(the accession process), but also supported the Annan Plan as a means for transforming the conflict 
border in Cyprus. Such a decision not only marked the most significant divergence in positions 
between Cypriot and Greek officials for many years, but also led to further withdrawal of Greek 
support and distancing of the Greek position from that of Papadopoulos within the EU and bilaterally 
with Karamanlis making it clear that „we do not want…to be two against 23 against in the union…the 
interests of Greece are above the interests of any other country, irrespective of how friendly it is‟ 
(Cyprus Mail 2006). More recently, Greece has also made clear that support for Turkey is not 
unconditional. Indeed, Karamanlis, in March 2009, underlined that Turkey‟s path to the European 
Union was very much dependent on it changing its strategy of manifest manipulation and „fully 
complying with its European obligations‟ arguing that „full implementation also means full accession‟.  
Greece has also iterated that the historical security framework of „guarantees‟ and „interventions‟ does 
not have a place in the EU, that the Annan Plan „belongs in the past‟, and that full normalisation of 
relations with Greece presupposed a solution to the Cyprus issue. To this end, Greece continues to lend 
its support to the intercommunal dialogue under the auspices of the UN, to allow a solution to be found 
by „Cypriots themselves‟, although many have argued that Greece should raise its profile and use its 
influence to greater effect inside and outside the EU to facilitate the normalisation of relations (and 
thus a more open EU frontier) between Cyprus and Turkey (Reunifying Cyprus, 2008; 23).   
20
 Papadopoulos was active in PEKA, the political section of EOKA (a Greek Cypriot military 
resistance organisation that fought for self-determination and for union with Greece in the 1950s), and 
took part in the London Conference in 1959, voting against the signing of the London and Zurich 
agreements. 
21
 They have also been critical of the policy of Mehmet Ali Talat and have included the Peace and 
Democracy Movement, Communal Liberation Party, Unified Cyprus Party, Turkish Cypriot Chamber 
of Commerce as well as a handful of trade unions, business groups and intellectuals (see Kaymak and 
Vural, 2006, 18).  
22
 When Turkey did sign the additional Protocol on 29 July 2005 it attached an accompanying 
declaration stating that signing, ratification and implementation of the protocol did not amount „to any 
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form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus‟. The Protocol has not, at the time of writing, been 
implemented by the Turkish Grand National Assembly  
23
 The Luxembourg (2005) and Finnish (2006) Presidencies    
24
 The vulnerability of the AK Party within Turkish domestic politics was demonstrated in 2008 by the 
opening of a case by the Turkish Constitutional Court against the AK Party on the accusation of 
harbouring a hidden agenda to build an Islamist state.    
25
 EDEK is the „Movement of Social Democrats‟  
26
 Ironically, this has less to do with the EU‟s normative power, than with domestic dissatisfaction with 
the Papadopoulos regime.  
27
 In the many meetings between Papadopoulos and Talat agreement was never reached despite the July 
8, 2006 „UN agreement‟. 
28
 Where 16 measures were agreed for immediate implementation in the low-level issues of cultural 
heritage, environment, crisis management, crime and criminal matters.  
29
 At the time of writing (April 2009) twenty four face-to-face meetings had been held between the two 
leaders.  
30
 See Bailie and Azgin (2006) for an interesting account and analysis of how the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot media projected a conflict-centred approach towards the opening of the Ledra Street opening in 
2005-6.  
31
 Although the list of products that can be traded remains unchanged. The prohibition on animal 
products, which excludes honey and fish at present, remains in place.   
32
 This would not apply to cigarettes and alcohol. 
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